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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine command-and-control (CAC) policies and market-based 
instruments (MBI) in the context of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The 
CRP, an MBI in the form of subsidies, is by far the largest agro-environmental policy 
implemented to date. We compare the environmental performance of the CRP as 
implemented to a few counterfactual CAC polices using EPIC (Environmental Policy 
Integrated Climate), a bio-physical simulation model. In the context of multiple 
environmental indicators, no policy alternative emerges as a clear winner. The 
importance of the choice and design of CAC policies is emphasized.  
 
 
Keywords: command-and-control policy, Conservation Reserve Program, market-based 
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SUBSIDIES! THE OTHER INCENTIVE-BASED INSTRUMENT: 
THE CASE OF THE CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM 
 
 
Introduction 
Environmental economists have produced numerous studies on the potential 
efficiency gains associated with the flexibility that firms gain from market-like or 
incentive-based regulatory approaches.1 While much has been learned from these 
explorations, they are primarily ex ante in nature and designed to address questions about 
the potential efficiency gains that could accrue from the implementation of a well-
functioning incentive-based system relative to a command-and-control (CAC) policy that 
has actually been in place. In contrast, there has been relatively little study of the 
efficiency of actual incentive-based programs, relative to a hypothetical CAC strategy.2  
While the efficacy of the SO2 trading program increasingly is being studied (Carlson 
et al. 2000; Schmalensee et al. 1998; Arimura 2002), there is in general a paucity of ex 
post studies of the effectiveness of incentive-based mechanisms. This omission has been 
credited largely to the sparse existence of such programs. But in fact, incentive-based 
instruments for environmental control are not particularly rare in one large sector: 
agriculture. Rather, environmental programs in agriculture have a long history of 
implementing incentive-based instruments, albeit with a notable twist: instead of 
charging fees or constructing tradable quotas, agricultural programs generally have paid 
farmers in the form of cost-sharing or subsidies to retire land or adopt environmentally 
friendly practices.  
Table 1 provides a summary, adapted from Claassen et al. 2001, of some of the key 
programs that have been implemented by the U.S. Department of Agriculture over the 
last century related to environmental performance of agricultural land and practices. 
These programs rely on voluntary participation and direct payments. Hence, these 
programs can be categorized as environmental subsidies: payments for undertaking 
activities that benefit the environment, although they are imperfectly “Pigouvian” in the 
sense that the payments are not directly linked to environmental effluent or performance.3 
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TABLE 1. Summary of major USDA conservation programs related to agriculture 
Title Duration  Program Summary 
Agricultural 
Conservation 
Program 
1936-1996 Annual expenditures of over $175 million 
during 1980s and 1990s. Cost-share provided 
for conservation practices on agricultural 
land. 
Conservation 
Compliance, 
Sodbuster, and 
Swampbuster 
1985- Requires farmers with highly erodible land to 
implement a soil conservation plan or lose 
eligibility for federal support programs. 
Conservation Reserve 
Program 
1985- Farmers retire land for 10-15 years from 
production in exchange for per acre payment. 
Conservation Reserve 
Enhancement 
Program 
1996-  Same as the CRP except that farmers can sign 
up anytime of the year and it emphasizes 
federal and state partnership. 
Emergency Wetlands 
Reserve Program 
1993- Paid farmers to convert flood-damaged 
cropland to permanent wetlands. About 
90,000 acres enrolled through 1997. 
Environmental 
Quality Incentives 
Program 
1996- Provides education, technical assistance, and 
funding to farmers to adopt practices for 5-10 
years to reduce environmental problems. 
Payments capped at $10,000 per person. 
Wildlife Habitat 
Incentives Program 
1996- Provides cost sharing for development of 
habitat for wildlife. Cost share payments of 
up to 75% for 5-10 year commitments. 
Water Quality 
Incentive Projects 
 
1990-1996 Incentive payments provided for eligible 
producers to undertake 3-5 agreements to 
implement approved management practices. 
Over 800,000 acres enrolled in 1995. 
Wetlands Reserve 
Program 
 
1990- Easement payment and restoration costs for 
land permanently converted to wetlands; 
915,000 acres enrolled as of 2000. 
Conservation Security 
Program (CSP) 
2002- Green payments to provide incentives to 
farmers to adopt various environmentally 
friendly practices; details still being 
determined 
Note: Summarized from chapter text and Appendix 1 of Claassen et al. 2001, with additional information 
provided on the CSP. The CSP was established in the 2002 farm bill and has not yet been implemented. 
 
In this paper, we study a large and important example of an environmental subsidy 
program—the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The CRP was introduced in 1985. 
Prior to 1990, all acreage classified as “highly erodible land” (HEL) was eligible for 
enrollment in the program. From this set of land, administrators chose willing landowners 
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to enroll acreage in the program when their offer prices were less than the region-specific 
pre-determined rental prices. There was a minimum goal of 5 million acres to be enrolled 
in 1986 and at least 10 million acres each year for 1987–1989. These targets were met. 
The CRP is of substantial magnitude, both in terms of its budget and the environ-
mental benefits credited to it, which include erosion control, water quality, wildlife 
habitat, and drinking water supplies. For example, over the period 1982-1997, total 
erosion on U.S. cropland declined by about 49 percent, and much of this reduction is 
attributed to the presence of the CRP. Feather, Hellerstein, and Hansen (1999) estimated 
that the annual surplus from freshwater recreation, pheasant hunting, and wildlife 
viewing directly associated with the CRP totals almost $500 million. By almost any 
standard, the CRP’s budget outlay is enormous: over $15 billion was spent from 1989 
through 2000 in payments to keep up to 36 million acres out of production (Claassen et 
al. 2001), representing about 10 percent of total crop land. In contrast, for the SO2  
trading program, the total (annualized) cost of reducing emissions by 3.9 million tons in 
1995 was estimated to have been about $726 million (Schmalensee et al. 1998). To 
achieve the SO2 cap of 8.95 million tons in 2010, the minimum cost is estimated to be 
about $1.04 billion while an “enlightened” command-and-control policy would cost 
$1.82 billion (Carlson et al. 2000).  
While the CRP can be interpreted as a market-based incentive program in the sense 
that program participants are faced with a price signal in the form of payments for 
retiring land from production, it is important to note that there are several efficiency 
problems with a subsidy as a policy instrument. First, while per unit subsidies have the 
same short-run efficiency properties as a corresponding tax, they may generate 
inefficiencies in the long run because of excessive entry (Bramhall and Mills 1966; 
Baumol and Oates 1988). In essence, the subsidy may make it profitable for firms to 
remain in an industry, or for new firms to enter, when in its absence fewer firms would be 
present. However, an important exception for this inefficiency result occurs when there is 
a fixed factor associated with production of the externality-generating industry. In that 
case, the value of the subsidy can be expected to be capitalized into the price of the fixed 
factor, preventing excessive entry.4 Given that there is a fixed stock of highly erodible 
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land from which CRP contracts can be drawn, the long-run inefficiency associated with 
excessive entry may not be a significant problem in this case. 
Another potential difficulty with a subsidy program is that forward-looking firms 
may increase their emission levels prior to the imposition of a subsidy so that they can 
receive higher subsidy payments to abate (Kamien, Schwartz, and Dolbear [1966] appear 
to have been the first to raise this concern). Probably most troublesome for the case of the 
CRP is the potential deadweight loss associated with the social opportunity cost of funds. 
This argument notes that when the revenue used to pay subsidies comes from a 
distortionary tax system, a dollar of program expenditure represents an opportunity cost 
of more than a dollar (Wu and Babcock 1999). Large subsidy payments, such as those 
associated with a program as large as the CRP, can then have potentially large efficiency 
costs, depending upon the magnitude of the distortionary tax system. The estimates we 
provide in this paper do not account for this second-best nature of the tax system or other 
distortionary programs and thus may be unduly favorable toward a subsidy system 
relative to a CAC alternative that does not transfer revenue from the government to 
individual agents. 
Several previous empirical studies have considered the performance of the CRP 
(Osborne 1993; Reichelderfer and Boggess 1988; Babcock et al. 1996; Goodwin and 
Smith 2003). For example, Reichelderfer and Boggess (1988) noted that land enrolled in 
CRP results in reduced commodity program spending as well as savings in other 
conservation expenditures. They estimated these cost savings associated with the actual 
CRP implemented in the first year of the program and the cost savings that might have 
accrued had alternate selection criteria been employed in selecting parcels for enrollment. 
Babcock et al. (1996) focused on environmental targeting and investigated the 
proportion of gains achieved by the actual CRP relative to the environmental benefits 
achieved under targeting. Wu (2000) studied the magnitude of the “slippage” into 
cropped land of land that previously had not been cropped due to the price and 
substitution effects of the CRP program. Finally, Goodwin and Smith (2003) evaluated 
how much CRP erosion reduction benefits were offset by increased erosion resulting 
from other government programs. 
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In this paper, we ask a fundamentally different question from the previous empirical 
studies; specifically, we investigate whether a CAC form of regulation would be less 
efficient than a market-based instrument (MBI), and if so, by how much. That is, we seek 
to assess the policy as implemented relative to an essentially different—CAC—form of 
regulation. We then study the ex post performance of the MBI. In so doing, we provide 
information on the degree to which MBI programs, as they have actually been 
implemented, have or have not lived up to the original optimism with which economists 
viewed such instruments. In this vein, we follow the work of Carlson et al. (2000), who 
undertook an ex post assessment of the efficacy of the SO2 trading program in its early 
years, and Kolstad (1986), who studied the ex post performance of a variety of MBIs. 
Like Oates, Portney, and McGartland (1989), we study the degree to which well-
conceived CAC policies can be efficient alternatives to incentive-based measures. We 
also investigate a particularly understudied form of MBI: the subsidy. 
We begin the paper by discussing the key features of the CRP as it has been 
implemented and how the program has evolved over time. Next, we study the optimal 
ex ante CRP as an incentive-based instrument by providing a simple model to describe its 
optimal implementation in its early years. Using the same analytical framework, we 
describe two general types of CAC policies that might reasonably have been 
implemented in lieu of the actual MBI subsidy: one we term a “strict” CAC policy and 
the second we term an “enlightened” policy that allows more flexibility in attaining 
environmental improvements.  
Following this discussion of the pre-1990 policy and potential CAC alternatives, we 
present a simple model of the ex ante optimal CRP as it was implemented post-1990, 
when a more formal targeting of environmental benefits was introduced via the 
Environmental Benefits Index (EBI). We note that the same two sets of CAC policies 
could have been implemented as alternatives to the MBI subsidy. 
The second part of the paper contains a set of simulations designed to estimate the 
program cost and environmental consequences of counterfactual CAC policies, the 
ex ante optimal CRP as outlined in the theory section, and the actually implemented 
(ex post) CRP land allocations. We compare the incentive-based and CAC policies under 
two different baselines: (a) one in which the total amount of land acreage put into CRP is 
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held constant between the MBI and the CAC policies, and (b) one in which the total cost 
of the program is the same under the MBI and each CAC policy. The second baseline is 
particularly useful for assessing the efficiency of the policies, while the first is interesting 
because much of the (especially early) focus of the CRP was to assure a significant 
amount of land retirement from agricultural production.  
 
Incentive-Based Instruments: Actual and Ex Ante Optimal  
Conservation Reserve Program Strategies 
The CRP was initially managed to retire the most acres from production allowed by 
the budget authorization within the class of HEL (Smith 1995; Reichelderfer and Boggess 
1988; Goodwin and Smith 2003).5 Thus, it functioned as both an environmental program 
and an income support plan. It was an environmental program in that it targeted land that 
was particularly susceptible to soil and water erosion, but only in a rough and thereby 
potentially inefficient way since the category of HEL contains land that differs in many 
important environmental characteristics. The program also was implemented with income 
support and production control goals, as minimum requirements on the number of acres 
to be enrolled were met each year and limits on the number of acres per county were 
required. These acreage requirements assured that a large number of farmers were 
included in the program and that the funds were spread widely across the United States.6 
This program focus changed in 1990 when the EBI was initiated and used to identify 
land most desirable for retirement. Six environmental “factors” were used in constructing 
the EBI: wildlife, water quality, erosion, enduring benefits, air quality, and whether the 
acreage is located within a Conservation Priority Area. In sign-up 15, the first major sign-
up since EBI was used, the first three factors could earn up to 100 points in the index, 
with 25-50 points possible for the remaining three environmental factors.7 The cost of 
enrolling a parcel was a seventh factor in the index. While the weights for some factors 
and/or subfactors were adjusted for different sign-ups, the distribution of weights stayed 
largely the same. 
MBI policy 1. The pre-1990 CRP: Ex ante optimal CRP with an acreage maximiza-
tion objective. Suppose there are N parcels, each with a size of nx . The cost of converting 
a parcel to CRP is ib . As described above, in the pre-1990 CRP, land was chosen for 
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enrollment from among the bids offered primarily to maximize the amount of land 
enrolled. A regulator interested in maximizing acres enrolled from among the eligible 
land would solve the following:8  
 
i i
 max   such that 0,  and  , HELi i i i ix x b x B x X     (1) 
where the total budget, B, for the CRP is the total program expenditure, ix  is the amount 
of parcel ith land to be enrolled, and XHEL is the set of all land classed as highly erodible.9 
The first-order conditions (FOCs) to this problem are simply 
 
*
* *
* *
* * *
{ : b 0}
,       b 0;
0,       b 0;
,       b 0
i
i i i
i i
i i i
i
x x if
x if
x X x if
 



  
  
  
   
 (2) 
where *  is the optimized value of the Lagrange multiplier from the budget constraint.10 
A heuristic solution to this problem can be obtained simply by ranking each piece of land 
from lowest to highest in terms of its bid price and then accepting land into the program 
starting at the top until the budget is expended.  
Denote the total acreage, environmental benefit, and budget level associated with this 
solution as X0, E0, and B0. Once the accepted acres are identified, the environmental 
benefits of the program can be computed as 0 *i i
i
E x e , where the environmental 
improvement on parcel i is represented by k ki i
k
e e . The vector 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )mi i ie e e  
measures the various environmental features of interest such as soil erosion, nutrient 
runoff/leaching, wildlife habit, and carbon sequestration, and the weight placed on 
attribute k ie  is 
k . Thus, ei can be interpreted as an environmental index for each parcel. 
The EBI of the post-1990 CRP is an example of one such index, but others are possible. 
Alternatively, ei could be a measure of a single environmental amenity, such as the 
contribution of that parcel of land to improved water quality. This is equivalent to setting 
k  for all other factors to zero.  
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If landowners bid their opportunity cost, then the budgetary outlay (B) represents the 
social cost of the program as well as the program costs.11 In the ex ante optimal policy, 
farmers with low-cost land should offer it for bid and the regulator should choose the 
cheapest land to put into the program.  
Whether the actual CRP points correspond to the ex ante optimal ones depends upon 
whether the owners of the lowest-cost land enter low-cost bids, which then get selected. 
While we would predict that outcome in a full information market setting with no 
transaction costs, there may be a number of reasons why, in practice, the actual CRP land 
allocations do not match this optimal one. Carlson et al. (2000) ask whether the SO2 
program as implemented actually solved the trading problem efficiently; that is, whether 
the “right” firms traded so that all the gains from trade were truly exhausted. In the same 
way, we compare the optimal acreage-maximizing solution to the actual CRP policy. We 
refer to the actual CRP land allocation as the "ex post” or “actual” policy.  
In addition to assessing whether the CRP policy as actually implemented prior to 
1990 achieved the greatest acreage at least cost, we are also keenly interested in the 
environmental efficacy of the program after the  environmental benefits index was 
adopted to target land for participation. Thus we next consider the following: 
MBI policy 2. The post-1990 CRP: Ex ante optimal CRP with an environmental 
maximization objective. A regulator interested in maximizing acres enrolled from among 
the eligible land would solve the following:12 
 
i i
max   such that 0,  and  ,
i
HEL
i i i i i i
x
e x x b x B x X     (3) 
where the objective function now is to maximize environmental gain from the program. 
The FOCs to this problem are 
 
*
* *
i
* *
i
* * *
i
{ : b 0}
,       e /b 0;
0,       e /b 0;
,       e /b 0,
i
i i i
i i
i i i
i
x x if
x if
x X x if
 



  
  
  
   
 (4) 
where *  is again the optimized value of the Lagrange multiplier. Ranking each parcel 
from highest to lowest based on its environmental contribution per cost and choosing 
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those parcels to enroll until the budget is exhausted will yield an optimal solution. This, 
of course, corresponds to the efficient solution. Again, once the accepted acres are 
identified, the environmental benefits of the program can be computed. 
 
Command-and-Control Alternatives 
In considering the CRP as a market-based instrument and comparing its efficiency to 
a CAC policy that might have been implemented instead, we define two types of CAC 
regimes, employing the terminology of Carlson et al. (2000). A “strict CAC” regime is 
one that treats all sources of environmental damage (or benefit) the same, regardless of 
(a) the costs of compliance or provision of the environmental service, and (b) the benefits 
associated with compliance or provision. In such a policy, each firm or farm faces the 
same standard, technology requirement, or other obligation. In contrast, an “enlightened 
CAC” regime treats all sources the same in one of the two dimensions, costs, or benefits, 
but makes allowance for variation in the sources costs of environmental compliance or in 
the heterogeneity in benefits, but not both. Clearly, a “super-enlightened” CAC regime 
that took account of both would be on a par with a well-functioning MBI from an 
efficiency perspective. We consider counterfactual policies of both CAC types beginning 
with a strict CAC approach.  
CAC policy 1. Strict CAC, equal percentage reduction in HEL. In its purest form, 
this policy would require that all farms with HEL retire a fixed percentage of HEL land 
from active production. This approach clearly would be in the spirit of CAC since all 
farms are treated the same, regardless of the opportunity cost of retiring land or the 
erosion benefits from doing so. This policy could be implemented on a farm scale (its 
purest form), on a county scale (equal percentage reduction required of all counties), or 
possibly on a state scale. Denote the total acreage, environmental benefit, and budget 
level associated with this solution as X1, E1, and B1. Note that X1 = X0. 
This policy also could be implemented by enrolling land into the program until the 
total cost is the same, resulting in different levels of acreage enrolled. In this case the 
program would yield B1 = B0, but not X1 = X0.  
CAC policy 2. Enlightened CAC policy, erosion index ranking. In this case, the policy 
will target land for enrollment based on a measure of environmental performance. Here 
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we choose the erodibility index as a likely candidate since during the 1980s erosion 
control was a primary environmental concern for agricultural land.  
The policymaker’s problem is to maximize the environmental benefit by deciding 
which land to enroll. The optimization could occur at the entire state level or within a 
specific county; in either case, the policymaker wants to choose the parcels to enroll 
based on a specific environmental index (ei) to maximize erosion benefits. Thus, the 
policymaker’s objective is to  
 max  such that 0.
i
i i i
x i
x e x   (5) 
In this case, ei is a scalar measure of erosion benefits. A comparison between this policy 
and the incentive-based policies can be accomplished in two different ways. First, the total 
amount of land in the state enrolled in the program can be held constant so that the 
regulator faces the constraint that i
i
x X . The first-order conditions for this problem are 
 
*
* *
* *
* * *
{ : e 0}
,       e 0;
0,       e 0;
,       e 0.
i
i i i
i i
i i i
i
x x if
x if
x X x if
 



  
  
  
   
 (6) 
The conditions indicate that the optimal policy is to enroll land into the program until the 
total acreage cap X is reached. Denote as e  the EBI as the erosion benefit of the parcel 
where *ie  . Another way to interpret the first-order conditions is that parcel i should 
be enrolled in CRP i.f.f. ie e .  
Heuristically, the solution can be found by ranking the parcels from highest to lowest 
in terms of the value of their environmental index. Parcels would then be accepted into 
the program until the acreage constraint is satisfied. Denote the total acreage, 
environmental benefit, and budget level associated with this solution as X2, E2, and B2. 
Again, X2 = X1 by construction. 
A second way to compare this policy to the incentive-based approach is to hold the 
total program cost constant. In this case, parcels are accepted into the program until the 
budget is exhausted: 
i
.i ib x B 13 In this case, by construction, E2 = E1. 
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Data and the Environmental Benefits Model 
The data for simulations come from the National Resource Inventory (NRI). The 
NRI sample design ensures statistical reliability for state and multi-county analysis of 
non-federal land (Nusser and Goebel 1997). Since the bulk of Iowa private land is in 
agricultural use, the NRI sample is ideally suited to represent Iowa agricultural land. In 
the simulations, we regard each NRI point as representing one producer with a farm 
homogeneous in management and in natural conditions. The size of the farm is assumed 
equal to the number of acres represented by the point (the NRI expansion factor). 
The 1997 NRI data are based on surveys conducted at five-year intervals since 1982. 
The data provide information on land use and natural resource characteristics of the land 
in the survey years. In addition, land use information is available for the three years 
preceding the survey years. For the NRI points in CRP, the information on conservation 
practices established and the year of CRP sign-up is provided. For the NRI points in crop 
production, information on the crop grown and conservation practices is available.  
A site-specific erodibility index, 1i ie EI , is provided in the NRI. To compute the 
estimates of other environmental improvements from CRP enrollment, we use the 
Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model version 1015 (Izaurralde et al. 
2002)14. EPIC is a simulation model commonly used for large regional analyses (e.g., 
Plantinga and Wu 2003; Babcock et al. 1997b. We use EPIC to obtain the estimates of 
water erosion, wind erosion, N loss in sediment, NO3 loss in runoff, NO3 subsurface loss, 
NO3 leaching, labile P loss in runoff, and P loss in sediment.  
At each of the NRI data points, two 30-year EPIC simulations are run, one assuming 
continuous cropping, and another assuming that the point is in CRP. The NRI database 
provides baseline land use and other input data for the simulations. The quantities of the 
environmental benefits from CRP are computed as the differences between appropriate 
EPIC outputs under continuous cropping and CRP, averaged over the 30 years.  
A site-specific per acre opportunity cost of converting a parcel to CRP, bi, was 
estimated using a CRP rental rate function. The rental rate function, fitted on the census 
of Iowa 1987 CRP contracts, relates the CRP rental rate to the parcel location and its 
suitability for agricultural use. Details on the rental rate function estimation are provided 
in the Appendix. 
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Simulation Results 
Because the 1997 NRI contains resource information in five-year intervals since 
1982 and the CRP was initiated in 1986, we had three possible years from which to 
choose: 1987, 1992, or 1997. We chose CRP land enrolled in 1987 as our baseline. The 
other NRI years are less suitable for our study. Compared to 1987, there was little CRP 
enrollment in 1992, making meaningful study difficult. For 1997, the NRI does not have 
site-specific enrollment information for land enrolled in that year. A CRP parcel’s 
enrollment year is important because we need to choose CAC points in the same year as 
the actual CRP points’ enrollment year in order to make valid comparisons.  
Table 2 gives a list of the policy scenarios studied, along with their total CRP 
acreage, average erodibility index (EI)15 number of enrolled land, and total EI gained by 
each program. For the CRP program as implemented, 800 NRI points in Iowa were 
enrolled in 1987, with a total of X0 = 1,095,800 acres at an annual cost of B0 = 
$90,519,251. The total acreage (X0) or the annual program cost (B0) is used to ensure that 
alternative policy scenarios have comparable scales. Because the pre-1990 CRP is more 
consistent with targeting HEL acreage rather than maximizing environmental benefits, 
we analyzed only one ex ante optimal MBI designed to maximize the amount of HEL in 
the program. In line with this focus, the only strict CAC policy evaluated is the one for 
which the total acreage enrolled equals the acreage for the CRP as implemented. In the 
case of enlightened CRP, the CAC policy enrolls land into CRP with the highest EI until 
the total acreage is reached or until the total program cost is exhausted. When the total  
 
TABLE 2. Summary of CRP policies studied 
Policies Total acres Average EI Total EI 
MBI policy 0: the actual CRP 
(X0, B0) 1,095,800 20.1 22,025,580 
MBI policy 1: the ex ante 
optimal CRP (X1, B0) 1,288,641 24.4 31,442,840 
CAC policy 1: the strict CAC 
CRP (X0, B2) 1,095,800 53.9 59,063,620 
CAC policy 2a: the enlightened 
CRP—equal acres(X0, B3) 1,095,800 56.4 61,803,120 
CAC policy 2b: the enlightened 
CRP—equal costs (X4, B0) 1,174,300 55.0 64,586,500 
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acreage is used as a cap, we call the CAC policy based on EI the “equal acreage 
enlightened CAC.” When the total cost is used as a cap, we call the CAC policy “equal 
cost enlightened CAC.”  
Profile of CRP Land under Alternative Policies 
The ex ante optimal CRP policy enrolls land with the lowest costs. Therefore, this 
policy is able to enroll the most land into CRP. The acreage enrolled is X1
 
=1,288,641 
acres, 17.6 percent more than the acreage of the actual CRP.  
Land enrolled in the actual CRP accounted for about 15.8 percent of cropland with 
an EI greater than 8 (i.e., highly erodible land) in Iowa. This percentage number is used 
as a basis for the strict CAC policy. More specifically, each county enrolls the same 
percentage, 15.8 percent of its highly erodible land into CRP, which implies that the total 
enrolled land under the strict CAC is equal to the total acreage of the actual CRP. 
The average EI of the actual CRP (20.1) is much lower than the average EI of the CAC 
policies (56.4 for the equal acreage enlightened CAC). The equal acreage enlightened CAC 
has an annual cost of about B3
 
= $84,600,000, which is lower than that of the actual CRP, 
B0. Conversely, the equal cost enlightened CAC is able to enroll more land (X4
 
= 1,174,300 
acres). This is because land with a higher EI tends to have lower values than land with a 
lower EI. While the average EI is highest under the enlightened CRP with equal acreage 
constraint, the total EI is higher under the enlightened CRP with equal costs. 
The distribution of CRP land under the different policies, as shown in Figures 1 
through 5, is one way to illustrate their different implications. Figure 1 indicates that land 
enrolled in the actual CRP is fairly evenly distributed around the state. By construction, 
land enrolled in the strict CAC program is also evenly scattered in the state. However, the 
ex ante optimal CRP program would enroll land predominantly in southern Iowa and a few 
counties along the Missouri River, where land in general is cheaper than in other parts of 
the state. The CRP land under the two enlightened CAC policies comes mainly from 
counties in the south and along the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers on the state boundary. 
The two policies have similar CRP land distributions because they have the same criterion 
for enrollment, and the only difference lies in how the total CRP acreage is set.  
It is interesting that both the ex ante optimal CRP and the two enlightened policies 
move land away from a uniform distribution across the state to more acreage enrolled in  
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FIGURE 1. The distribution of CRP acres: the actual CRP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. The distribution of CRP acres: the enlightened CAC—equal acres 
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FIGURE 3. The distribution of CRP acres: the enlightened CAC—equal costs 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. The distribution of CRP acres: the strict CAC 
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FIGURE 5. The distribution of CRP Acres: The ex ante optimal 
 
the south and along the two rivers. At first blush, this is surprising given that the criteria 
used to identify the plots of land enrolled are different: costs in the cases of the ex ante 
CRP and the erodibility index in the case of the CAC policies. But, as Babcock et al. 
(1997a) note, this result is expected when there is a strong negative correlation between 
an environmental amenity (EI in this case) and the cost of the land.  
Another way to illustrate the difference between the actual CRP and a counterfactual 
policy alternative is to identify which parcels would be enrolled in a CRP program 
whether the parcel selection was made as it actually was (the actual CRP program) or had 
it been made using the decision criteria of a counterfactual policy. Table 3 lists such 
overlapping acres between the actual CRP and the counterfactual polices examined in this 
paper. It is clear that the extent of overlap is quite small in all cases; thus, the alternative 
decision criteria may have significant environmental consequences.  
The different location of CRP points under the different policies also implies that 
different people may benefit from the CRP policies. For example, the benefit of improved 
soil productivity from reduced erosion is mainly enjoyed by local land owners. On the 
other hand, some environmental benefits are more regional; for example, the reduction of 
nutrient runoff in Iowa may help relieve the hypoxia situation downstream in the Gulf of  
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TABLE 3. Common land enrolled both by the counterfactual CRP and by the actual 
CRP 
Policies Acres 
% (of the total actual  
CRP acres) 
The ex ante optimal CRP 35,100 3.20% 
The strict CAC CRP 12,100 1.10% 
The enlightened CRP—equal acres 8,500 0.78% 
The enlightened CRP—equal costs 9,600 0.88% 
 
Mexico. In this case, the different CRP land distributions may be less significant, 
although the spatial location of the CRP points may have significant regional 
consequences as well. In any case, it is important to know the relative magnitude of each 
dimension of environmental benefits in order to assess the overall implication of CRP. 
Extensively validated bio-physical models, such as EPIC, can provide information on 
such relative magnitudes.  
Quantitative Differences in Environmental Benefits Shown by Simulations 
After the points for alternative policies were selected, we ran EPIC simulations on 
them to obtain quantitative information on environmental indicators, including soil 
erosion, nutrient loss, and carbon sequestration. For land under all policies, either the 
actual CRP or the counterfactual CRP policies, we ran two sets of EPIC simulations: 
simulation assuming the land is under CRP practices and simulation assuming the land is 
under non-CRP practices.16 We obtained the amount of environmental gain (or loss, if 
negative) by taking the difference between these two sets of simulations. For example, 
the number in the first row and the first column of the data in Table 4 indicates that the 
actual CRP policy achieved an annual erosion reduction of about 3,394,129.88 tons, as 
compared to the non-CRP situation. The results of the simulations are reported in Tables 
4 and 5 and Figures 6 and 7.  
From Table 4, we see that the ex ante optimal CRP does not necessarily have better 
environmental performance in all aspects, even though it enrolls significantly more (17.6 
percent) land. In fact, there is a clear non-uniformity of ranking among the different 
environmental indicators. For example, the actual CRP policy results in less water 
erosion reduction but more NO3 leaching reduction and more carbon sequestration than
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the ex ante optimal policy. This implies that, on a per unit of land basis, carbon 
sequestration and reduction in NO3 leaching is much lower under the ex ante optimal 
CRP than under the actual CRP. This is illustrated in the first two columns of Table 5.  
In Table 5, we present the per acre environmental gain (or loss) under all CRP policy 
alternatives we have discussed. Just as in Table 4, the gain (or loss) is relative to the non-
CRP situation. For example, the number in the last row and last column of Table 5 
indicates that the strict CAC policy actually would result in less carbon sequestered in the 
soil in the amount of 55.426 kg, relative to the non-CRP situation. Such per unit 
performance measures can help explain the underlying reason that one policy performs 
better than another policy. Again, comparing the actual CRP and the ex ante optimal, the 
former has a higher per acre water erosion reduction than the latter; however, the 
opposite is true when all acres under the policies are considered. This is because of the 
larger amount of land enrolled. Moreover, although both policies have similar per acre 
reduction in NO3 loss subsurface, the ex ante CRP turns out to be better when all acres 
are taken into account.  
From the last three columns in Table 5, we see that the three CAC policies have very 
similar environmental performances: the numbers not only have the same sign for each 
indicator but also are comparable in terms of magnitude. This similarity is likely because 
of the fact that the EI is used as a targeting tool in all three CAC policies. As Table 2 
shows, all of them enroll land with high and similar average EIs.  
Two interesting results emerge from Table 5. First, in environmental policies 
(including the actual CRP), the EI is often used as an indicator for the potential of 
environmental benefit. By definition, the EI indicates the potential of a soil to erode 
based on climatic factors and the physical and chemical properties of the soil. 
However, results in Table 5 show that, on average, higher EIs do not necessarily mean 
a higher erosion reduction upon conversion to CRP. In particular, a higher erosion 
reduction is achieved under the actual CRP, not the ex ante optimal, although the 
latter has a higher average EI. However, compared to the actual CRP or the ex ante 
optimal CRP, the three CAC policies (with much higher average EIs) do have higher 
erosion reductions. 
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Second, higher EIs do not necessarily imply higher performance in other environ-
mental indicators. Carbon sequestration provides a good example: all three CAC policies 
actually obtain less carbon storage in the soil than do conventional agricultural uses. In 
fact, the best carbon sequestration is obtained through the actual CRP, which has the 
lowest average EIs among all of the policies studied.  
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate how the environmental performances of the three CAC 
policies compare to those of the actual CRP and the ex ante optimal policy. In both 
figures, the bars indicate the environmental performance differences in percentages. A 
positive percentage indicates better performance under the CAC policies and a negative 
percentage indicates better performance under the actual CRP (in Figure 6) or the ex ante 
optimal (in Figure 7).  
Note that the two figures look similar to each other. Both graphs show that, 
compared to the CAC alternatives, the actual CRP and the ex ante optimal CRP obtain a 
higher reduction in wind erosion and NO3 leaching, higher carbon sequestration, a lower 
reduction in water erosion, N loss through sediment, and subsurface NO3 loss. The major 
difference comes from P loss runoff and NO3 loss runoff. The similarity of the two 
figures suggests that for most indicators we would get similar conclusions whether we 
compare the CAC alternatives with the actual CRP or with the ex ante optimal. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Based on these simulations, the evidence is at best unclear as to the relative 
advantage of MBI and CAC policies as applied in the case of CRP. More HEL acreage 
with a higher average EI could have been enrolled in the subsidy program than actually 
was accomplished, implying that the MBI could have achieved greater efficiency. This is 
consistent with the findings of Smith (1995). In terms of overall environmental benefits 
from the program, there is no clear winner between the ex ante optimal MBI and the 
actual CRP. 
Compared to a CAC alternative, the market-based instrument of CRP yielded less 
enrolled HEL acreage for a given budget outlay. When the acreage totals are held 
constant, the budget outlay is lower and the average EI is higher with the CAC 
alternatives. However, from the perspective of environmental gains, for the same 
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program cost, the actual MBI policy as implemented seems to be preferred to an 
enlightened CAC policy (i.e., the equal-cost enlightened CRP) in some environmental 
aspects (e.g., carbon sequestration and wind erosion) but not in others (e.g., water erosion 
and subsurface NO3 loss).  
There are many CAC policy alternatives. In our study of CRP, the EI forms the basis 
for all of the CAC policies. Our results concerning the efficiency of CAC relative to the 
MBI are undoubtedly highly influenced by this choice; with a different method for 
implementing the CAC, the policy would be more or less attractive relative to the MBI. 
The use of the EI to form the basis for the CAC policy is intuitive and consistent with a 
long history of agricultural conservation policy, making it a natural choice for study. 
Alternative choices could be an interesting topic for future study. 
As our results show, even if a policy is intended to reduce erosion, EI may not be the 
best targeting tool. Of course, if policymakers intend to reduce multiple adverse 
environmental effects, the EBI might be employed. Our ongoing research involves 
examining how the application of EBI will change the effectiveness of different policies. 
  
Endnotes 
1. A few examples include Oates, Portney, and McGartland 1989; Hahn 1989; and 
Kling 1994. Tietenberg 1985 provides an excellent table and summary of this 
literature. 
2. Kolstad’s (1986) work is an important, early exception. 
3. The motivation for adopting a subsidy was likely due more to its voluntary nature 
than any efficiency property associated with its market-based price information.  
4. This is an example of the more general case known in the literature as a “closed” 
class; see Holderness 1989. 
5. While maximizing acreage was not the stated goal of the program, analysts have 
concluded that the implementation was largely consistent with a maximum acreage 
objective. 
6. As Kathy Segerson noted when discussing this paper, an alternative approach to 
achieving least-cost land retirement would have been to issue land use permits for 
farming on HEL and to allow them to be traded. This would have retained the 
voluntary nature of the program with a much lower total program cost. 
7. Specifically, the points associated with the three remaining factors are enduring 
benefits for up to 50 points, air quality for up to 35, and location in a Conservation 
Priority Area for up to 25. More information on the computation of the EBI is 
available in USDA-ERS 1997. 
8. As long as the budget is large enough, the constraint on total acreage described 
above will not be binding, and if the budget is not large enough, no solution is 
feasible. 
9. The CRP also limited the number of acres that could be enrolled within any county, 
but this limit was rarely reached and appears to have provided only minimal real 
constraint on program participants or regulators. 
10. Throughout the paper, we use “*” to indicate optimized values. 
11. As noted in the introduction, if the social cost of funds is greater than the private 
costs, the total program costs will underestimate the full social costs.  
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12. As with the model (1)-(2), as long as the budget is large enough, the constraint on 
total acreage previously described will not be binding, and if the budget is not large 
enough, no solution is feasible. 
13. Note that the budget constraint is used to identify how many parcels can be enrolled, 
that is, how far down the rank ordered list the authority can afford to go. But unlike 
the optimal environmental CRP, the cost of enrolling parcels is not used to rank the 
parcels. 
14. Earlier versions of EPIC were called Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator 
(Williams 1990). 
15. EI is a number that indicates the potential of a soil to erode based on climatic factors 
and the physical and chemical properties of the soil. A higher index indicates that a 
greater investment is needed to maintain the sustainability of the soil resource base if 
intensively cropped; thus, a higher index for enrolled land indicates more program 
erosion benefits. 
16. Non-CRP practices, which are obtained from the NRI data, include various farming 
alternatives, e.g., a piece of land may be under corn-soybean rotation with reduced 
tillage. 
  
Appendix 
Estimation of the CRP Rental Rate Function 
To estimate the function relating the per acre CRP rental rate to the parcel location 
and its suitability for agricultural use, we used the data on all the actual CRP contracts 
enrolled in the program in Iowa in 1987 (USDA-FSA 2003). Out of the 15,270 records 
available, 15,221 were complete and used in estimation.  
The rental rate function model is described as 
 
98
0
1
i ji ji i i
j
rent class    
 
       
Here the subscript i refers to the ith contract (i=1,…,15,221), subscript j refers to the jth 
Iowa county, irent is the CRP rental rate in dollars per acre, ji is the county indicator, 
i.e., 1ji   if parcel i is located in county j and zero otherwise, and iclass is the land-use 
capability classification of the parcel. The land-use capability classification system 
evaluates land according to its limitations for agricultural use with the land of classes 1 to 
3 suitable for cultivation, land of class 4 suitable for limited cultivation, and land of 
classes higher than 4 not suitable for cultivation (Troeh and Thompson 1993). The i is an 
error term, and the  	
							

data are presented in Table A.1. 
Estimation of model (A.1) on the data resulted in good fit (R2 = 0.852). As expected, 
the estimate of  is negative and statistically significant meaning that land better suited for 
agricultural production requires higher CRP rental rate. For the sake of brevity, the estimates 
of the parameters are not reported here but are available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
TABLE A.1. Summary statistics for the data used in estimation of CRP rental rate 
function 
Variable    Mean  St. Dev. Min  Max 
CRP rental rate, $ per acre 78.40 8.40 35.0 90.0 
Land-use capability class 3.36 0.96 2.0 8.0 
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